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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

VERA T. CALLISTER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER, .
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF
Civil No. 7967

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as one of the points raised in connection
with this appeal relates to the interpretation to be given
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judg-ment originally entered by the trial court in the above
entitled matter, in the light of the agreement executed by
the parties, respondent desires to set forth briefly the
facts relating to the action and leading up to the instant
proceedings in which respondent sought to have the
original judgment amended as to the amount of alimony
which he had to pay.
The action for divorce was originally commenced by
plaintiff against defendant on May 5, 1945. The com-plaint as filed requested the court to grant to the plaintiff
( 1) half of the real estate owned by defendant, par-ticularly the home located at 44 2 "A" Street, and the
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property in Cottonwood; (2) one half of the stocks and
bonds; ( 3) cash in the amount of $1 0,000.00; ( 4) alimony
in the sum of $600.00 per month and support money in
the sum of $150.00 per month; (5) certain insurance
policies; and (6) household furniture and the 1937 Buick
Sedan Automobile (R. 4). Thereafter and while the ac..
tion was pending the parties executed an agreement en. .
titled "Agreement of Property Settlement and Alimony"
which bears the date of July 28, 1945 (Exh. A). Upon
the execution of this property settlement, which also pro..
vided for payment of alimony by the defendant, the plain..
tiff went into court on the 30th of July, 1945, where the
matter was heard and the court found that said agree..
ment for property division and alimony and support money
"is just, fair and reasonable" (R. 8). The court further
awarded to the plaintiff, pursuant to the agreement of
the parties which the court found to be just and reason. .
able, all of the items requested in the complaint and
enumerated in numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 above. As to
item number 4, however, the court without referring to the
agreement between the parties reduced the demand
of alimony from $600.00 to $400.00 per month and the
amount of support money from $150.00 to $50.00 per
month. The court in its findings, conclusions and decree
specifically set out the real property which the plaintiff re ..
ceived and referred to the securities as "one. .half of the
securities attached in Schedule A of Exhibit A which is
attached to the findings of fact and conclusions of law
on file herein and by reference made a part hereof"
(R. 20). The decree further provided in paragraph 5
thereof that "plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded judg..
ment against the defendant for alimony in the sum of
2
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$400.00 per month during the life of plaintiff or until she
remarries and for support money in the amount of $50.00
per month for the support of the minor child" (R. 21).
The judgment was dated the 30th of July, 1945 (R.23).
The defendant complied with the decree and made all
payments of alimony coming due under it (R. 46, 47).
Thereafter, on July 14, 1952, defendant, respondent
herein, filed a motion to amend the judgment with respect
to the alimony payments and requested the court to reduce
the amount from $400.00 to the sum of $200.00 or such
lesser amount as the evidence might justify under the cir..cumstances. Plaintiff appeared and filed an answer re. .
questing the court to increase the amount of alimony from
$400.00 per month to $500.00 per month on the ground
and for the reason that since said decree had been made
and entered the circumstances and conditions upon which
it had been based were materially changed and that
plaintiff was in need of the additional sum as alimony.
The matter came on for hearing before the court on the
28th day of November, 1952, on the motion of the de. .
fendant and the answer of the plaintiff. Thereafter, and
while the matter was still before the court-but follow . .
ing the introduction of respondent's evidence-the plain. .
tiff requested leave to file an amended answer, which re . .
quest was granted, and the amended answer, omitting
the claim for additional alimony, was filed on the 5th
of December, 1952 (R. 30, 31, 116). The amended an. .
swer, like the first, admitted that the divorce decree pro . .
vided "that plaintiff was to receive the sum of $400.00
per month as alimony." (R. 30).
At the hearing on the motion no objection was made
to the introduction of evidence on the ground that the
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court did not have authority to modify the judgment for
alimony, nor was the question raised with respect to the
right of the court to modify the judgment with respect
thereto until after the amended answer had been filed on
December 5th. The first intimation that counsel in this
matter had that plaintiff relied upon the "Agreement for
Property Settlement and Alimony" between the parties
as being binding and not subject to modification was when
counsel for the plaintiff at or near the conclusion of the
entire case stated "the alimony in this case is a matter of
contract. We have withdrawn from our answer here, the
affirmative relief of increasing this alimony. That is not
our contention" (R. 147).
·
The court after taking the matter under advisement
with respect to defendant's motion for amendment of
the decree found that the original decree of July 30, 1945,
provided in part that "plaintiff be and she is hereby award ..
ed judgment against the defendant for alimony in the
sum of $400.00 per month" (R. 151); that since the
entry of said decree defendant's income has materially
been reduced and that he has been suffering from a heart
condition consistant with coronary artery disease which
has become progressively worse, requiring him to abstain
from activities producing physical and mental strain or
from prolonged exertion (R. 152). Based upon the fore . .
going findings, the court determined that the defendant
was entitled to have the alimony reduced from $400.00
per month to the sum of $250.00 per month and entered
a decree to that effect, dated December 31, 1952.
ISSUES
In connection with this appeal, appellant has attack . .
ed all of the findings of the court without specifying any
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particular finding and has argued the issues under five
separate headings. For the purpose of replying to the
arguments of appellant, respondent presents the follow . .
ing points to the court for consideration:
1. The monthly payment is alimony and therefore
subject to modification.
2. The evidence supports the finding of the Court
that the defendant's income has been materially reduced
since the original decree.
3. The evidence supports the finding of the Court
that defendant's health and his ability to earn have be. .
come impaired.
4. The evidence supports the Court's findings that
plaintiff is receiving an adequate income and that the at. .
torney fees and costs in the instant proceeding should be
borne by the respective parties to this action.

ARGUMENT
I
THE MONTHLY PAYMENT IS ALIMONY AND
THEREFORE SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION.
At the outset there should be no argument with the
proposition that if the provision in the original div~rce
decree to the effect that the plaintiff ''be and she is hereby
awarded judgment against the defendant for alimony in
the sum of $400.00 per month" (R. 21) is a judgment
for alimony, such judgment is subject to subsequ~ent modi . .
fication or change by the court even though the decree it. .
self does not specifically reserve that right. The pro . .
visions of our statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 30. .3 . .5
reserve the right of the court to make such subsequent

5
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modifications as the court shall deem reasonable and
proper. See, also, Jones vs. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.
2d 222. Thus, the sole issue is whether or not the agree. .
ment between the parties was an independent contract
of the parties or whether it was embodied in the judg. .
ment so to be superseded by the judgment and· therefore
become alimony. An examination of the decree of divorce
in this case (R. 19) and an examination of the con. .
elusions of law upon which the court made its original
decree does not show that the court merely approved
the contract between the parties but rather indicates that
the court used this as a basis to aid the court in deter. .
mining how much alimony should be paid and the court
rendered judgment for $400.00 per month as "alimony."
Obviously, from a reading of the decree as well as a
reading of the conclusions of law it appears that the
court adopted the identical wording found in the agree. .
ment between the parties ( R. 12).
The courts appear to be in accord in holding that
where the contract is not merely approved by the court
but is rather adopted and incorporated into the decree,
that the agreement thereby becomes merged in the decree
awarding alimony and support money. Any such agree . .
ment between the parties loses its contractual nature so
that the court may thereafter modify the decree as to
the amount to be paid. See annotation in 166 A.L.R. 679.
In a case heretofore before this court, Jones vs. Jones,
supra, the parties had entered into a stipulation to govern
the property rights of the parties in the event a divorce
was granted. This stipulation was incorporated in the
findings and constituted a basis for the decree for alimony
and for the support of the children. On appeal the ques.6
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tion predented to the Supreme Court was whether or
not the court had jurisdiction to modify the provisions of
the alimony decree which was originally based upon a
stipulation between the parties. The court held:
"The question raised by the first contention
can no longer be considered an open question in
this State. In the recent case of Barraclough vs.
Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P. 2d 792, 793,
this identical point was raised. The parties had en..tered into a stipulation governing the amount of
alimony to be paid. The stipulation was incorpor..ated into the findings and made the basis for the
alimony decree. The plaintiff filed a petition to
modify the decree. We held in a Per Curiam
opinion, that the court had the power to modify
such a decree. In so holding, we stated: 'In a
divorce action the trial court should make such
provision for alimony as the present circumstances
of the parties warrant, and any stipulation of the
parties in respect thereto serves only as a recom. .
mendation to the court. If the court adopts the
suggestion of the parties it does not thereby lose
the right to make such modification or change
thereafter as may be requested by either party
based on some change or circumstances warranting
such modification.' ''
The agreement between plaintiff and defendant (Ex . .
hibit A attached to the findings (R. 12) and also Exhibit
A in this proceeding) indicates that the parties are using
the written memorandum for the purpose of settling the
differences and claims with respect to "property, alimony,
support money, attorneys fees, and court costs." The
stipulation shows that a divorce proceeding was already
in process between the parties, t~e complaint having been
filed on April 7, 1945 (R. 6). The agreement between the
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parties was made on the 28th day of July, 1945, while
the decree of the court was entered on the 30th day of
July, 1945. The decree recites throughout that this is for
the purpose of settling the differences between the parties
as to alimony and property and refers in paragraph three
that the second party pay to the first party as "alimony"
the sum of $400.00 per month. This is undoubtedly a
compromise between the amount asked for by the plain. .
tiff in her complaint wherein she requested alimony in
the sum of $600.00 per month on both her first cause
of action and also on her second cause of action.
In the case of Alder vs. Alder, ( 1940) 3 73 Ill., 361,
26 N.E. 2d 504, (Writ of Certiorari denied in 1940, 311
U.S. 670, 85 L.ed 430, 61 S.CT. 29) the court in that
case had before it the question of a modification of a
decree and held as follows:
"Respondent could rely on the contract for
the payment, and in the event of a breach of any
of its parts could bring appropriate action for the
enforcement of its provisions, or she had the right
with the approval of petitioner to have a consent
decree entered adopting the provisions of the agree. .
ment. The latter action having been taken, the pro. .
visions for quarterly payments to respondents as
provided in the supplemental trust indenture and
trust agreement of December 1, 1922, became
merged in the decree. The fact that the decree
adopted the terms of the agreement did not destroy
or defeat the power of the court to alter such pro-visions when a change of circumstances justified a
modification. Maginnis vs. Maginnis, 323 Ill. 113,
153 NE. 654; Herrich vs. Herrich, supra; Camp
vs. Camp, 158 Mich. 221, 122 NW. 521."
The case of Hough vs. I-Iough ( 1945) 26 c~l. 2~:
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

605, 160 P. 2d 15, presented a similar question involving
a separation agreement between the parties and a sub..sequent divorce decree in which this ·agreement was in..corporated. There the court held:
"Turning first to the relation between the
separation agreement and the divorce decree, it ap..pears to be well settled that if the agreement is
presented to the court in a divorce proceeding for
adjudication, and the agreement, or a part there..of, is incorporated in the decree and made a part
thereof, the part so incorporated is merged in the
decree.... In Holloway vs. Holloway ( 1935) 130
Ohio St. 214, 198 NE 579, 154 ALR 439, supra,
the issue involved was whether a holding for con..tempt for failure to pay support allowances under
a divorce decree which was based upon a separa..tion agrement incorporated therein would be an
unlawful imprisonment for debt, and the court held
it would not because the obligation was on the
decree and not the agreement, stating at page 580:
' ... A decree which incorporates an agreement is
a decree of court nevertheless, and as soon as in..corporated into the decree the separation agree . .
ment .is superseded by the decree, and the obliga. .
tions imposed are not those imposed by contract,
but are those imposed by decree, and enforceable
as such. Once the contract is merged into the ·
decree, the value attaching to the separation agree..
ment is only historical.' " (Italics added).
The case of Barraclough vs. Barraclough, supra, de. .
cided by this court in 1941 and also cited by appellant
in her brief in which the court has stated:
"However, the law with respect to property
settlements not being applicable to situations where
alimony is involved, we need not enter into a dis..-

9
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cussion of the above rule, which we conclude that
the 'stipulation' the substance of which was incor..
porated by the court in its decree, was not a prop..
erty settlement but an agreement as to what 'ali..
·many' the court might award appellant in case a
divorce was granted. It did not constitute a settle..
ment of property rights between the parties. The
agreement was just what it said it was, to wit: a
'stipulation' as to what appellant was willing the
court should award her as alimony. And the decree
was so treated as an award of alimony by both
parties and the court. On two different occasions
appellant sought the assistance of the court in com..
pelling respondent to abide by its terms or be
punished for contempt. The court willingly ex..
ercised its contempt power to enforce the decree;
and respondent made no objection to such pro..
cedure on the ground that the decree sought to be
enforced was not one for alimony.
· "Therefore, the trial court erred in deter..
mining that the agreement here constituted a 'com.plete and final settlement of all alimony between
the parties, and that such settlement has become a
final judgment as to alimony :t- :t- :t- insofar as a
petition to modify is concerned.' In a divorce ac ..
tion the trial court should make such provision for
alimony as the present circumstances of the parties
warrant, and any stipulation of the parties in
respect thereto serves only as a recommendation to
the court. If the court adopts the suggestion of
the parties it does not thereby lose the right to
make such modification or change thereafter as
may be requested by either party based on some
change in circumstances warranting such modifica ..
tion. And where an appeal is taken from the judg..
ment of the trial court in such case we will review
the record to determine whether or not the appli.10
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cant is entitled to the relief sought in the petition
to modify the alimony decree. Hampton vs. Hamp. .
ton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. 2d 419; Openshaw vs.
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. 2d 364."
In the instant matter it vvas conceded by all of the
parties to this proceeding that the decree for alimony was
subject to modification since both plaintiff and defendant
originally requested the court to modify the decreeplaintiff seeking to increase the award while defendant
sought to decrease it. In her amended answer plaintiff
further admitted "that said decree provided that plaintiff
was to receive the sum of $400.00 per month as alimony."
Nor did plaintiff raise any affirmative defense with respect
to the purported binding and conclusive nature of the
Agreement for Property Settlement and Alimony in the
pleadings filed in the case. In view of these facts the
court might well say as it did in ·the Barraclough Case,
supra, "the decree was so treated as an award of alimony
by both parties and the court."
Insofar as the. agreement of the parties in · this case
is concerned it treats of the subject of property settle. .
ment as well as the subject of alimony. Under the first
provision plaintiff was to receive in effect one. .half of all
of defendant's property - both real and personal. This
property settlement was complied with and is not in dis . .
pute. The parties also agreed upon the amount of alimony
which appellant was to receive, it being the position of
the respondent herein that the alimony provision stands
in the same position as a stipulation between the parties as
to the amount the court could award as alimony. This
was in fact adopted by the court in the decree which is
referred to herein.

11
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As hereinbefore stated, every divorce decree in this
state in which alimony is granted to the party must be
deemed to have been made or entered by the court sub. .
ject to the provisions of our code, Section 30. .3 . .5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which authorizes the court to
modify or revise the decree in case of a change of circum. .
stances or where the conditions of the parties have been
materially altered. See Buzzo vs. Buzzo ( 1915) 45 Utah
625, 148 Pac. 362.
The California court has summarized this position
in the case of Johnson vs. Johnson ( 1930) 104 Cal. App.
283, 285 Pac. 902, 904:
"When the court awards alimony to an in . .
nocent wife it is not bound by the terms of a con. .
tract between the parties, either as to its amount or
its duration. The power to make the award is
drawn from the terms of the statute and not from
the agreement of the husband and wife. It follows
that the power to modify the award of alimony,
either as to amount, duration, or time and manner
of payment, is inherent in the court, unhampered
by the terms of -any contract which the parties
might have entere.d into providing for the payment
of any such alimony, when it is given in the order
or decree as mainn!nance only. Smith vs. Superior
Court, 89 Cal. App. 177, 264 P. 573; Soule vs.
Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 87 P. 205; Gates vs. Gates,
54 Cal. App. 407, 202 P. 151; notes 58 A.L.R.
639."
See, also, the annotation in 109 A.L.R. 1068.
The \Xlyoming Supreme Court in the case of Lona . .
baugh vs. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 Pac. 2d 199, held
that where a divorce decree has adopted in part a contract
of the parties relative to property settlement in alimony
12
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payments, the court nevertheless, under the powers of a
statute similar to ours authorizing the court to modify
or amend its original decree, has the power to modify
the decree relating to alimony notwithstanding such con . .
tract between the parties. This case was cited and ap . .
proved and followed in a subsequent case of Buchler vs.
Buchler, ( 1949) 65 Wyo. 452, 202 Pac. 2d 670. The Su. .
preme Court of the State of Washington has held in the
case of Heuchan vs. Heuchan, (1951) 38 Wash. 2d 207,
228 Pac. 2d 470, 476:
"The property settlement agreement is no
hurdle, however, because, when appellant stipulated
at the time of his first petition for modification that
the payment provided for in the property settle. .
ment agreement were alimony, the payments ceased
to be a matter that could be controlled by con. .
tract between the parties and became subject to
such modification, alteration, and revision by the
court 'as circumstances may require.' "
So in the present case the parties hereto had enter. .
ed into an agreement whereby the vJife was to receive ali . .
mony as therein provided and then incorporated this pro . .
vision as an alimony payment in the decree, thus making
it alimony subject to the modification by our court under
the provisions of the statute heretofore cited.
Point is made by appellant of the fact the alimony pay. .
ment is supposed to continue during the lifetime of the wife
or until she shall remarry. Thus, it is argued, this is not a
proper alimony payment but is based upon a contractual
relation between the parties. This court, in the case of
Murphy vs. Moyle, ( 1898) 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010,
referred to the laws of Utah, 1888, which read substan. .
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tially the same as present statute, Section 30. .3. .5 and
stated:
"This statute is broad and comprehensive.
Under it the court has power to make such a decree
as the circumstances may warrant, and doubtless, if
there is danger of the father squandering the estate,
or if, from hostility or other cause he is likely to
refuse maintenance to his wife, or support to his
children awarded to her, and thus leave the chil..
dren to be supported by the mother without aid
from his estate, the court may make such order,
respecting the property and the suport and main.tenance of the wife and children, as is just and
equitable, and such order or decree may be made
to continue in force after his decease; and the
court may afterwards, if occasion shall require it,
make such change in any decree as 'will be con..
ductive to the best interest of all parties concern..
ed.' " (Italics added).
Thus, it is possible that a decree which provides for
alimony payment to the wife may survive the death of
the husband. It is within the discretion of the court as
to whether or not alimony payments have to be paid by
the husband's estate after his death and until the death
of the wife. See the notes in 18 A.L.R. 1050; 101 A.L.R.
326.
Appellant relies upon the case of Ettlinger vs. Ett.linger (California) 44 Pac. 2d 540, to the effect that the
property settlement could not be modified in the instant
matter. In the Ettlinger Case the property settlement was
approved by the court; and the decree provided:
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed
that in pursuance of the aforementioned agreement
the plaintiff do have and recover from the defen.-
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dant the sum of $250.00 per month." (Italics
added).
In distinguishing the property settlement involved in
the Ettlinger Case with a previous case of Armstrong vs.
Armstrong, 132 Cal. App. 609, 23 Pac. 2d 50, the Su. .
preme Court of California stated:
"The instant case, as distinguished from the
one just cited, presents an express confirmation and
adoption by the court of the property settlement
agreement. The court was therefore without juris. .
diction to thereafter modify its provisions.''
The court further stated:
"In our opinion, the contract suggests that
such payments were to be made to and received by
plaintiff as part of the property settlement and in
lieu of property rights. This would appear to have
been recognized in both the interlocutory and final
decrees of divorce for each provides that 'neither
the making of this decree nor anything herein con. .
tained shall in any manner modify, restrict, affect
or prejudice the provisions or any of them, of said
agreement hereinabove mentioned which agreement
and all of its provisions shall remain in full force
and effect.' Each decree thereupon directs the pay. .
ment by defendant to plaintiff of $250.00 a month
'in pursuance of the aforementioned agreement.' "
{Italics added).
Thus, in the Ettlinger Case the court had before it
an agreement of property settlement only and not one
of property settlement with an additional provision with
respect to alimony, which the court was required to pass
upon. In the instant matter, the court in its decree referred
to the agreement when it came to the matter of the division
of the property, lfz of the real and personal property being
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decreed and set aside to the plaintiff in paragraph 3 of
the decree. Paragraph 5, however, of the decree, relates to
the matter of alimony and makes no reference to the
agreement between the parties in awarding to the Plaintiff
the sum of $400.00 per month during her life or until
she remarries.
With respect to the provision in the decree to the
effect that the alimony shall be paid until plaintiff re..
marries, such provision itself is an indication that it is
alimony and not an award of property in lieu of alimony.
In the case of Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal. App., 2d 526, 112 Pac.
Zd 780, the property settlement agreement and the decree
in connection with the divorce each provided that the pay..
ments would continue following the remarriage of the
plaintiff. In that case after the plaintiff remarried the ap..
pellant moved to modify the decree and eliminate further
payments accruing after such marriage and the court in
refusing to modify the decree stated:
"The further clause that 'said (monthly) pay..
ments to continue even in the .event of remarriage'
indicates also that it was the intention of the par.ties that respondent should receive the full $2, ..
400.00.''
In the Rich Case the decree of the court originally
provided:
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed
that defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of
$2400.00 as alimony for her support and main.tenance, payable as follows." . . . .
The decree set out the time and conditions of the
payment and then ended with the provision "said pay-ments to continue even though plaintiff remarries." Qb..
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viously, where the total amount of the money to be paid
by the defendant to the plaintiff was specified in the
agreement as well as in the decree and further both the
agreement and the decree provided that such payments
were to continue even though the plaintiff were to re..marry, the Appellate Court properly required those pay. .
ments to continue in the event of the remarriage of the
plaintiff.
In the case of Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal. 2d 833,
136 Pac. 2d 1, cited by appellant, the court commented
on the fact that the agreement between the parties "re. .
cites that the parties desire to effect a complete settlement
of their property rights, that the provisions in the agree..ment shall be in full satisfaction of all rights to support
and maintenance." After discussing the terms and con..ditions of the agreement and the settlement therein made,
the court further stated:
"Although neither the value nor the character,
community or separate, of the property was speci..fied in the agreement, it would seem that the bulk
of it was set over to the husband. . . . The court
designated the agreement as a 'property settlement'
. . . The court found that the divorce decree was
made 'pursuant to and as a part of a property
settlement agreement.' "
Therefore, because of the facts set out above and
because the agreement provided for the payment of
$250.00 per month during such time as the parties re..mained married and following their divorce, the Supreme
Court refused to allow the decree to be modified holding
that it was, in fact ,a property settlement between the
parties and not alimony.
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All of the California cases relied upon by appellant
are distinguishable on the facts from the instant case but
the statements of law set out by the court in the various
opinions would indicate that in this particular case the
agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, insofar as
the provision for alimony is concerned, was only a atribu.
tation as to what the parties felt to be fair and reason ..
able but subject to the discretion of the court. We there-fore submit that the evidence supports the determination
of the court that the provision for alimony could be modi-fied and that it was not a matter of contract between the
parties which the court could not change.

II
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF
THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S INCOME
HAS BEEN MATERIALLY REDUCED SINCE THE
ENTRY OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE.
While not directly attacking the finding of the lower
court to the effect that respondent's income has been ma-terially reduced since the entry of the original decree, ap-pellant proceeds on the theory that the evidence shows
that Dr. Callister has "voluntarily impoverished" himself
and therefore such voluntary impoverishment should not
be a grounds for a modification of the divorce decree. We
submit that the evidence in this respect does not show
any voluntary impoverishment. On the other hand it
shows a constructive effort on respondent's part to build
up a practice of medicine and to provide adequate and
wholesome facilities for the treatment of patients who
might come to him. Dr. Callister testified that the oc ..
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cupancy and use of the clinic has made it possible for
him to devote more time to his practice; that he had very
few house calls and a great deal of his "work is surgery
and plastic surgery and I am able to concentrate all of
my efforts in one spot and be able to accomplish quite
a little with less effort." That the operation of the clinic
and hospital with his private practice made it easier for
him because of his physical and mental condition. (R.
111).
The case of Osmus vs. Osmu~, 114 Utah 216, 198
Pac. 2d 233, cited by appellants is in no way applicable
to the facts in the instant matter. There the court specif. .
ically stated that the evidence supported the trial court's
determination that the defendant had "intentionally de. .
prived himself of the ability to comply with such order."
The trial court had found that the defendant was in con. .
tempt of court for failing to comply with the order of the
court for payment of alimony (the amount of which he
had voluntarily consented to in connection with the ob. .
raining of the wife's divorce). The court held that "so
long as such decree stands, it is incumbent upon him to
comply with it, or at least to exercise every reasonable
effort to comply with it. If because cause of change in the
circumstances of the parties it appears that the decree is
inequitable, or impossible to comply with, he may petition
for modification."
In the instant case the defendant has complied with
the order of the court and made reasonable effort to com. .
ply but has sought relief from the order on the grounds
of change of conditions and circumstances which the trial
court found to have occurred, and therefore such deter. .
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mination of the trial court should be affirmed on appeal.
This court has an numerous occasions had before it
appeals involving the question of whether the evidence
was sufficient to show a change of circumstances justifying
a reduction in alimony. In the case of Hampton vs. Hamp..
ton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. (2d) 419, the lower court re..
fused to modify the decree as to alimony and support
money. This judgment was reversed on appeal by the Su..
preme Court on the grounds that the evidence showed
that defendant's salary had been reduced from about $2,..
100 to $1,500. Since the original divorce he had remarried
and had one child by his second wife, who were de..
pendant upon his for support.
Respondent, in this case, testified that in the year
1944 his gross professional income was $26,069,08 and
that after deduction of expenses and depreciation he had
a net income from his practice of $12,686.91. At that time
respondent was occupying quarters in the Medical Arts
Building (R. 92). He testified it was necessary in the
interests of his profession that he move to the new loca..
tion and have a clinic and hospital available in order to
render better service to his pateints-many of whom came
to him for plastic surgery where it required that they be
hospitalized only a short time (R. 93.-95). As a result of
operating the clinic in connection with his medical practice
the respondent's gross income materailly increased-but
likewise the expenses of maintaining his office, the clinic,
and expenses for nurses, professional assistants, and up.keep have increased so that in 1951 he had a net income
(before payment to Mrs. Callister of $4800.00 alimony)
of $6699.64. (R. 52). The preceding year (1950) when
the clinic was operating separately as a noh.-profit corpora.20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

decree was originally entered (Exh. F). In neither 1950
nor 1951 did he have to pay any Federal income. tax.
For the first six months of 1952, respondent's net income
(after interest, depreciation and taxes) was $3653.25 out
of which he paid appellant $2400.00 alimony. (R. 53).
Appellant argues that respondent should not be al;
lowed depreciation as an item of expense. It is noted that
in calculating his income as of the time of the original
divorce decree, depreciation was an item considered in
arriving at his net income. Too, in lieu of payment of rent
for office space (which was required when Dr. Callister
had offices in the Medical Arts Building) depreciation
on the building is taken at the rate of $2500.00 per year
(Exh. G). Certainly this is not exorbitant rent to pay for
the use of his quarters and for the clinic. The balance of
the depreciation is for the equipment used in his profes;
sion-much of it being instruments which have to be re;
placed frequently in order to keep up with the standards
of the profession - particularly in the field of plastic
surgery. Likewise, in calculating appellant's income from
her apartment house operations, such net income was
determined after a generous allowance for depreciation.

III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF
THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S HEALTH
AND HIS ABILITY TO EARN HAVE BECOME IM;
PAIRED.
Very little is said by appellant in respect to the mat..ter of respondent's health. Dr. Viko, eminent in the field
of heart diseases, testified that he was long acquainted
with both of the parties to this action (R. 34); that in
April, 1949, he gave respondent a physical check. .up,
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tion, Dr. Callister had a gross income from his practice
of only $22,717 ~97, considerably less than when the divorce
which included an electrocardiogram; that the purpose of
taking an electrocardiogram is to determine whether there
has been any heart muscle change; that he then found
"'nothing abnormal about the heart, and the electrocardio. .
gram was normal." (R. 35..-36). ·Since that time he has
examined respondent on January 27, 1951, and again on
May 28, 1952, on both of which occasions he found heart
muscle change-there being additional change occurring
between January, 1951 and May, 1952 (R. 37). He finally
examined the respondent just a few days before the hear. .
ing in the instant matter and found that in some respects
the electrocardiogram was better and in another way
worse (R. 38). "It showed quite marked irregularity of
a kind known as auricular premature beats." (R. 38). As
to the future condition of respondent Dr. Viko testified
that "this is one of the most unpredictable types of heart
disease there is. There is very great variation from case to
case in the rate of progress of the disease. Often it will
stand still without progress for long periods; there may
be a period of improvement; there may be a sudden episode
that markedly changes the course for the worse." (R. 38,
39). As a result of his findings the witness testified that
he had advised respondent to curtail his nervous and
physical activities; to avoid night work as far as possible;
to avoid long hours of work in his practice; and to avoid
strain of any kind. (R. 39).
On cross..-examination counsel for appellant asked Dr.
Viko if it would not have _been possible for Dr. Callister
to have been suffering anginal pain in March, 1945, when
he apparently indicated in a letter (Exh. B) that he had
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suffered from such pain. Dr. Viko stated that when he
examined Dr. Callister in 1945 the latter advised the
witness that he had been suffering from a pain over the
heart "which he wondered about as being anginal and
at that time, in my opinion, it was not heart pain." The
witness testified that he diagnosed the pain as being an
"intercostal neuritis." (R. 43).
In addition to the testimony of Dr. Viko, which
stands uncontradicted, we also have the testimony of
respondent as to his general physical condition, his in . .
ability to work long hours; the nervous strain he is re. .
quired to work under at times in order to keep up the
payments necessitated by the divorce decree. Certainly the
evidence in this case is much stronger than that in the
case of Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P. 2d
364, where the Supreme Court reversed the trial court
and modified the decree as to the payment of alimony,
reducing the same, stating:
"The real question in controversy is: Can the
husband pay an allowance of $175 per month? He
says he cannot and that the decree is oppressive for
that reason. The evidence seems to bear out his
contention to some extent. His health is failing. Un . .
less he slows up in his work, according to the testi . .
mony of his physicians, who seem to be disinterest. .
ed witnesses, he will suffer a breakdown. His in. .
come in recent years from the practice of his pro . .
fession has been falling off and will fall off more
when he reduces the extent of his practice."
IV

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S
FINDINGS THAT PLAINTIFF IS RECEIVING AN
ADEQUATE INCOME AND THAT THE ATTORNEY
23
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FEES AND COSTS IN THE INSTANT PROCEEDING
SHOULD BE BORNE BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES
TO THIS ACTION.
Appellant argues that her income (which, together
with the present alimony payments of $250 per month is
greater than respondent's) is a result of "prudent man. .
agement of capital assets received at the time of the
divorce." We readily concede that appellant has done well
with the property which she received in the divorce. In
1951 she received from rentals (after allowance of inter..
est, taxes and depreciation-the latter being a bookkeep..
ing entry only) the sum of $4,255.85. In addition, she
received dividends from stocks, interest from loans and
investments, and capital gains from sale of properties. Cer. .
tainly this is just another circumstance justifying the modi. .
fication of the decree. It shows that Mrs. Callister is com. .
petent to care for herself and provide an income sufficient
for all her needs, thus making her independent of respon..
dent. The award of alimony is not a "penalty" which
should be enforced against respondent. Under the pro-visions of Sec. 30. .3. .5, U.C.A. 1953, the court may make
such order with respect to alimony or expenses "as may
be equitable." We submit that the determination of the
court in the instant matter requiring the parties each to
bear his own costs was equitable and justified under the
evidence. There is no evidence that appellant is in finan-cial need or that she does not have adequate income or
finances to pay her attorneys. No request was made for
an allowance of costs or attorney fees pending the action,
as is frequently done where the divorced wife has no in.dependent income and the husband has failed to com..
ply with the order of the court.
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The sole claim which appellant seems to have to be
allowed attorney fees and costs is that the property settle. .
ment agreement so provides. However, since the court
already has discretion to allow attorney fees and costs
under the statute, the provision is of no effect. Too, this
was a proceeding to modify the divorce decree-not to
change or modify the Property Settlement Agreement. Ap. .
pellant did not plead a violation of such agreement and
hence there is nothing in this case which would justify a
determination that attorney fees should be awarded .

.CONCLUSION
By way of summary, and in conclusion we respect. .
fully submit:
1. The decree awarding plaintiff. . appellant the sum
of $400.00 per month as alimony was subject to modifica. .
tion upon a showing of a change of conditions and circum. .
stances. The parties have at all times treated the decree
as one for alimony and so treated it in the lower court.
No issue was raised by the pleadings to the- contrary;
and the fair and reasonable interpretation to be given to
the agreement and the decree of the lower court is that
the provision is one for alimony and not a contractual
obligation between the parti,es arising solely from the
written memorandum.

2.

The evidence sustains the findings of the trial
court as to the change of conditions and circumstances
justifying a reduction of alimony from $400 to $250 per
month and requiring each party to bear his own costs.
As we view the matter the evidence is such that the low. .
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er court might well have reduced th.e alimony more than
it did so that appellant should not be heard to complain.

3. The judgment of the lower court should be af..
firmed, appellant to pay the costs incurred in connection
with this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
DEAN E. CONDER
Attorneys /or Respondent.
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